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Although not new, tax incentives have known major changes over recent years and it is 
becoming an increasingly important instrument in the policy mix to stimulate private R&D in 
many  countries  around  the  world.  The  OECD  reports  three  major  trends:  The 
implementation of R&D tax incentives schemes by a growing number of OECD and non-
OECD countries; A steady substitution of direct funding schemes for tax incentives schemes 
to stimulate business R&D; The many changes to tax incentives schemes most countries 
have done to increase the levels of generosity and attractiveness. This paper attempts to 
explain the motives behind these trends in R&D policy to stimulate private R&D and takes a 
multi-level approach as the issue involves political, strategic and economic considerations. 
The reasons behind the growing preference for tax incentives go much beyond any possible 
advantage these policies might have over direct measures, and are also the consequence of 
a political change in the EU R&D policy after the Lisbon Strategy and the subsequent actions 
to stimulate R&D expenditures, a change in the economic rationale of public support of 
private R&D in face of the insufficiency of market failures to justify that public intervention 
in a new context characterised by a public determination to increase the amount of business 
R&D expenditures, and the growing competition between countries for international R&D 
investment. 
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The use of public resources to support private R&D has long been deemed legitimate, and 
over  the  last  decades  governments  have  used  many  instruments  to  stimulate  firms  to 
increase R&D expenditures. Innovation and R&D is of concern to the European Union (EU) 
and many countries around the world, which have been adopting goals-based R&D policies 
to stimulate both based on two axiomatic principles: (business) R&D is the main driver of 
innovation and economic growth; and, current R&D expenditures are insufficient to reach 
the  desired  levels  of  innovativeness  and  competitiveness.  Governments  can  stimulate 
private R&D in a number of ways, but two major types of instruments stand out: direct 
measures  (or  direct  funding),  which  include  subsidies,  loans,  grants  and  alike,  and  tax 
incentives (or indirect measures), such as allowances and tax credits. Private R&D is also 
publicly supported in many other indirect ways, including income tax and social security tax 
reductions for R&D personnel in order to reduce the cost of performing R&D, the funding of 
research undertaken in universities and public research institutions, the creation of public 
research institutions, stronger measures of protection of intellectual property rights, and by 
improving the system of education.  
 
Although  not  new
1,  tax incentives  policies  to  promote  business  R&D have  known  major 
changes over recent years, and it is becoming an increasingly important instrument in the 
policy  mix  of  many  countries  around  the  world.  The  relative  weight  of  public  funds  for 
business  R&D  has  been  declining  constantly  and  government  funding  of  private  R&D  is 
nowadays increasingly taking place through tax incentives (Veltri et al. 2009). According to 
the  OECD  (2008a),  the  evolution  of  tax  incentives  policies  in  recent  years  has  been 
characterised  by  major  changes,  including:  i)  The  implementation  of  R&D  tax  incentives 
systems  by  a  growing  number  of  OECD  and  non-OECD  countries.  The  number  of  OECD 
countries with R&D tax schemes rose from 12 in 1995, to 18 in 2004, to 21 in 2008; ii) A 
steady  substitution  of  direct  funding  schemes  for  tax  incentives  schemes  to  stimulate 
                                                      
1 According to Hall and Van Reenen (2000), the first countries to introduce R&D tax incentives were Japan 
(1966), Canada (1960s), USA (1981), France (1983), Australia (1985).  
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business R&D; iii) The many changes to tax incentives schemes most countries have done to 
increase the levels of generosity and attractiveness, which is raising concerns about the use 
of these policy instruments for competitive purposes. This picture portrays the increasing 
importance of R&D policy in a fast-changing international context and raises the question 
about the motives which might explain these trends. Increasing the amount of business R&D 
expenditures is at the heart of the R&D policy of many countries, now emphasized by goals-
based R&D policies which require deeper involvement and commitment of governments, 
and a double strategy of reinforcing the internal R&D base and getting the country attractive 
to external R&D investments.   
 
This paper is concerned with the recent trends of R&D tax incentives policies and addresses 
the following question: Why are tax incentives increasingly used to promote private R&D? 
This question involves political, strategic and economic considerations and, thus, any answer 
requires  a  multi-level  approach.  The  reasons  behind  the  growing  preference  for  tax 
incentives go much beyond any possible advantage these policies might have over direct 
measures, and are also the consequence of a political change in the EU R&D policy after the 
Lisbon Strategy and the subsequent actions to stimulate R&D expenditures, a change in the 
economic rationale of public support of private R&D in face of the insufficiency of market 
failures  to  justify  that  public  intervention  in  a  new  context  characterised  by  a  public 
determination  to  increase  the  amount  of  business  R&D  expenditures,  and  the  growing 
competition between countries for international R&D investment. 
 
The paper analyses the issue of tax incentives policies from three different, but interrelated 
perspectives.  Section  2  examines  the  rationale  of  public  support  of  private  R&D  to 
understand  in  what  extent  the  conventional  understanding  on  this  matter  is  being 
challenged in the face of the changes of R&D policy and the new competitive environment 
for R&D investment. Section identifies major trends of today’s political and strategic intent 
of R&D policy and their implications to the way governments can promote private R&D. 
Section 4 focus on the effectiveness of public support of private R&D to explain the relative 
advantages of taxes incentives over direct measures and the current understanding about 
the effectiveness of tax incentives. Some conclusions and policy implications end the paper.  
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2. Rationale of public support of business R&D 
 
The  public  support  of  research  is  generally  deemed  legitimate,  not  necessarily 
uncontroversial. There are several economic and social benefits of funding basic research, in 
particular in the area of fundamental research and enabling technologies, but the case for 
public  funding  of  business  R&D  is  rather  more  controversial,  especially  in  development 
stages directly linked to the introduction of commercial products or systems where it is likely 
that waste is avoided if it is funded by firms (Freeman and Soete 1997). This issue gained 
renewed interest for economics and public policy in the context of the Lisbon Agenda, the 
Action  Plan  for  Europe  for  investing  in  research  (European  Commission  2003a)  and  the 
ambition of becoming ‘the most  competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world’. Not just the legitimacy of public support of business R&D has become ‘officially’ a 
rhetoric question, but the efficiency of the public support of private R&D has been equated 
in quantitative terms and all Member States were challenged to design appropriate policy 
mixes and work at full steam to reach the EU R&D objectives. 
 
Market failure is no longer the sole justification for the public support of private R&D. Two 
other factors must be considered: innovation and economic growth, and the competition for 
R&D investment and researchers (Table 1). While the former started to gain shape in the 
public policy at least from the 1990s as the understanding about the R&D function within the 
firm and the systemic implications of R&D across the economy became clearer, the latter is 
new and is largely the result of the political efforts of many countries around the world to 
increase the R&D expenditures over the first decade of this century. Rivalry of tax systems to 
attract R&D investment is nothing new, but it is new the purpose, scale and intensity, both in 
terms of the benefits offered and the number of countries offering them. These factors are 
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Table 1 Rationale of public support of private R&D
2 
Rationale  Policy driver  Focus 
Market failures 
Investment in R&D 
below social optimum 
-Industries and technologies showing 
underinvestment in R&D;  




(Business) R&D as the 
basis of innovation and 
growth 
-Technological change;  
-Accumulation of knowledge;  
-Absorptive capacity;  
-Spillovers of R&D activities to other firms and 
industries;  
-Interaction between firms, universities and 
research institutions; 







-Enhancing external attractiveness for R&D 
investment and researchers;  
-Retaining R&D resources and human talent; 




Many scholars believe that the production and dissemination of knowledge exhibit a range 
or market failures and these failures are likely to undermine incentives to invest in R&D and 
introduce new innovations (Geroski 1995). Knowledge is a public good and its production 
(R&D)  suffers  from  the  three  sources  of  market  failure  (indivisibilities,  uncertainty  and 
externalities) and, as a consequence, firms tend to underinvest in R&D because the private 
rate of return to R&D investments tends to be lower than the social rate of return. That is, 
private R&D investment is not optimal from a societal point of view because social returns 
are higher than private ones, which discourages firms to invest (more) in R&D (Geroski 1995; 
OECD 2002; Van Pottelsberghe et al. 2003). A firm’s incentive to invest in R&D is diminished 
to the extent that any findings from such activities are exploited by competitors and thereby 
diminish the innovator’s own profits (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). In this line of reasoning, for 
instance, it is economically justifiable and strategically important the use of public funds for 
applied agricultural research in the case where the structure of industry is based on family 
farms with no resources to finance their own R&D; on the contrary, it is questionable the use 
of public funds to applied research in aircraft and nuclear industries, cases in which public 
                                                      
2 Obviously, these factors may have a wider relevance in terms of  the S&T policy (e.g., basic research).  
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funding is political in nature (Freeman and Soete 1997). It makes sense, thus, that public 
resources should be directed towards R&D activities with the highest discrepancy between 
social and private returns (Van Pottelsberghe et al. 2003). This is the conventional wisdom 
which provides governments the legitimacy to support private R&D efforts in the case of a 
great imbalance between private and social returns, even if it has never been clear how big 
that imbalance should be before any public support is deemed legitimate or necessary, or 
even how to accurately measure that imbalance. By urging Member States to implement tax 
policies to stimulate private R&D because they ‘support a wide population of firms, including 
SMEs,  while  leaving  enterprises  a  maximum  of  independence’  (European  Commission 
2003a), the EU is no longer legitimating its business R&D policy (solely) on the basis of 
market failures and it also ‘relaxes’ the commitment of public policies to that principle. 
 
Innovation and economic growth 
 
The  Action  Plan  for  Europe  clearly  links  the  EU  research  goals  and  economic  growth: 
‘Attaining the 3% of GDP objective for research investment would have a significant impact 
on  long-term  growth  and  employment  in  Europe’  (European  Commission  2003a).  It  is 
generally accepted in economics and empirically demonstrated the key role of (business) 
R&D in economic growth (Griliches 1995; Freeman and Soete 1997; Becker and Pain 2008). 
Put in a simple way, a country’s economic growth is largely correlated with its investment in 
R&D, namely business R&D; business R&D is the major driver of innovation which in turn is a 
major driver of competitiveness and economic growth. The EU set ambitious R&D goals for 
2010  aiming  to  increase  innovativeness  and  competitiveness  across  all  Member  States, 
catch-up  with  Japan  and  the  United  States  and  get  stronger  for  the  battles  ahead  with 
developing countries like China and Brazil. The third set of action to ‘make Europe the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-base economy by 2010’ says that ‘it is all the more 
important  to  ensure  that  budgetary  policies  favour  investments  that  will  lead  to  higher 
sustainable  growth  in  the  future,  among  which  research  is  a  strong  priority’  (European 
Commission 2003a). ‘For the first time, EU Member States report in a coherent manner 
about their priorities and activities in R&D […] aiming at the creation of economic growth 
and  more  and  better  jobs’  (Veltri  et  al.  2009).  It  is  probably  the  best  example  where 
economic growth has set the pace of public policy for promoting business R&D, but other  
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countries such as Brazil and China are following suit. 
 
The focus of R&D policy changed from industries showing evidence of market failures in 
business R&D to the economy as a whole, with different implications in terms of policy 
objectives, outcomes and efficiency. Governments stimulate private R&D not necessarily due 
to any imbalance between private and social returns in specific industries, but because it is 
believed  to  be  a  major  driver  of  future  economic  growth  based  on  knowledge  and 
innovation. It is fair to say that R&D policies aiming to tackle the issue of market failures 
envisage, ultimately, more innovation and economic growth as well, but it is not the same as 
having economic growth leading public policies towards business R&D since it is likely that 
industries and firms not showing signs of underinvestment in R&D will benefit from public 
support. This is the case of R&D tax incentives, which are ‘non-discriminatory’ (OECD 2008a) 
and give firms a ‘maximum of independence’ (European Commission 2003a) in selecting the 
research to undertake and carry a greater risk of ‘supporting projects which would have 
been performed anyway’ (CREST 2004). Tax incentives are mainly intended to encourage 
firms, including SMEs, to increase R&D expenditures, but the growing trend of conducting 
R&D policy in function of set political R&D goals increases the potential for the inefficient 
use of public resources. 
 
The rationale behind the public support of private R&D lies on the theories of technical 
change,  absorptive  capacity  of  firms,  spillover  effects  from  R&D  activities  and  national 
innovation systems. R&D policies are based on a better understanding of the R&D function 
within  the  firm,  the  advantages  of  having  a  business  research  base  within  borders,  the 
systemic  effects  of  R&D  activities  across  the  economy,  and  the  long  run  impact  on 
productivity growth. All Member States acknowledge the relevance of an excellent research 
base  in  terms  of  the  scientific  quality  and  the  relevance  of  research  with  regard  to  its 
potential economic use or societal relevance (Veltri et al. 2009). One critical component of a 
firm’s  innovative  capabilities  is  its  absorptive  capacity,  that  is,  ‘the  ability  of  a  firm  to 
recognize de value of new, external information, assimilate it and apply it to commercial 
ends’  (Cohen  and  Levinthal  1990).  Firms  invest  in  R&D  to  generate  innovation  and  to 
develop their absorptive capacity, which might be particularly important in more difficult 
learning environments. Firms that conduct their own R&D are better able to use externally  
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available information and an organization with higher levels of absorptive capacity will tend 
to  be  more  proactive,  exploiting  opportunities  present  in  the  environment  (Cohen  and 
Levinthal 1990). Another important aspect of R&D is the spillover effect, that is, the benefits 
that  a  firm’s  research  results  can  produce  to  other  firms  and  industries,  and  the  social 
returns that can accrue from that. Past research on R&D returns at the industry and national 
levels have found significant social returns to it (Griliches 1995). High levels of technological 
capability, including the ability to perform R&D, are therefore important for reaping both 
private and social returns from R&D within the economy (Clark and Arnold 2005). 
 
Competition for R&D investment and researchers 
 
Governments use a range of mechanisms to stimulate business R&D. It is said that the choice 
of approach – government research efforts, partnerships, direct support to business R&D, 
tax incentives, etc. – depends largely on the national context and conditions such as the 
overall innovation performance, perceived market failures in R&D, industrial structure, size 
of firms and the nature of corporate tax systems (OECD 2002). The optimal design of the 
policy mix depends on the specific strengths and weaknesses of national or regional research 
and innovation systems, and sector specific issues (European Commission 2003a). This R&D 
policy paradigm is, however, no longer suitable to respond to the new R&D international 
context where the new forms of internationalisation of R&D based on global sourcing and 
integration of complex knowledge bases are challenging national approaches (OECD 2008b). 
The R&D tax incentives schemes of many OECD and EU countries do not fit anymore in such 
a  paradigm  and  show  clear  signs  of  competition  for  international  R&D  investment.
3  A 
country R&D tax policy’s design is now a function of all other competing R&D tax schemes, 
and the impact of any tax incentives policy is affected by the magnitude of the incentive 
relative  to  other  nations’  tax  policies  (Tassey  2007).  This  new  context  has  important 
implications on the design and strategic intent of R&D policies. On the one hand, national 
policy  instruments  should  be  revisited  in  light  of  the  differential  impact  that  the 
internationalisation  of  R&D  has  on  their  relative  efficiency;  on  the  other  hand,  efficient 
policies  on internationalisation of  R&D  should  respond  to  national  concerns  in  terms  of 
attractiveness  and  competitiveness,  and  to  global  challenges  and  the  needs  of  the 
                                                      
3 The case of Portugal below illustrates this point.  
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developing world (OECD 2008b). 
 
There is a new ‘market’-based rationale of public support to stimulate business R&D, retain 
R&D  resources  and  human  talent  and  enhance  external  attractiveness  for  R&D-related 
foreign direct investment and qualified researchers. Indeed, there is competition among 
countries to offer attractive fiscal R&D incentives as part of their wider activities to attract 
and retain mobile R&D investments (Clark and Arnold 2005; OECD 2008a). At the beginning 
of  this  century  it  was  already  expected  that  the  new  EU  R&D  policy  would  increase 
competition for international R&D investment and human talent. The EU R&D objectives for 
2010 and the following policy actions taken to stimulate R&D across Member States has put 
greater  pressure  on  the  demand  side  of  R&D  resources  and  skilled  researchers,  and 
triggered many governments to increase the generosity of R&D tax incentives to the level of 
competition  among  countries.  The  Action  Plan  for  Europe  estimated  that  about  700000 
additional  researchers  were  deemed  necessary  to  attain  the  2010  objective,  and  that 
adjustment  would  imply  greater  efforts  from  all  the  stakeholders  to  attract  a  sufficient 
number of world-class researchers in Europe (European Commission 2003a). Similar policies 
have been put in practice by other countries such as China and Brazil which increased the 
competition to a global level.  
 
3. Political and strategic motivations 
 
A political push 
 
The Lisbon Agenda and the Action Plan to reach the Barcelona objective are two major 
political facts of great impact on the implementation and design of tax incentives policies 
within and outside the EU. This is due to the change in the EU R&D policy and the ambitious 
goals  envisaged,  the  ‘competitive  stance’  for  R&D  investment  taken  by  the  EU  and  its 
worldwide political and economic weight. Some important consequences from this change 
are worth mentioning. First, it put great pressure on the demand side of R&D investment 
and skilled researchers which could hardly be met by an inelastic supply side. Second, the 
EU’s message to non-EU countries that it would encourage and support policies to attract 
international R&D investment and qualified researchers called for a reaction even from EU  
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countries that do not have tax incentives policies. Third, increasing the amount of (business) 
R&D expenditures, including the amount of R&D performed by SMEs, has become implicitly 
prevalent  over  other  policy  aspects,  including  the  rationale  of  using  public  resources  to 
support private R&D, or considerations about which industries or technological areas should 
be the target of public support from a social viewpoint. Member States were pressed to 
implement policies to increase (business) R&D expenditures even if at the expense of some 
inefficiency in the use of public resources.  
 
Tax incentives schemes are flexible enough to respond to all of these political intents, can be 
used complementary to other policy instruments (namely direct measures), can be quickly 
adjusted to meet new policy R&D goals and are suited to be used by catching-up countries 
with structural underinvestment in business R&D.
4 This is the best instrument to promote 
business  R&D  (Atkinson  2007),  which  can  support  a  wide  population  of  firms,  including 
SMEs, while leaving enterprises a maximum of independence (European Commission 2003a). 
Tax incentives policies do not require a budget to be implemented which is very appealing to 
governments,  especially  in  the  context  of  economic  crisis.  Member  States  were,  thus, 
encouraged by the European Commission and the CREST
5 group to use fiscal measures to 
promote  private  R&D  (European  Commission  2003a;  CREST  2006)  with  no  particular 
requirements to attend to its potential inefficiencies, including the support of R&D projects 
chosen by firms on the basis of private returns, support of research that generates mostly 
private returns, support of business R&D that would have been performed anyway, support 
of research undertaken by multinationals with minimal expectations about its additionality 
effects, and support of research in sectors or technologies not strategic or not showing 




According  to  Hall  and  Reenen  (2000),  a  tax-based  subsidy  seems  the  market-oriented 
                                                      
4 In 2008, the 8 countries with the most favourable R&D tax treatment were Spain, Mexico, France, China, 
Portugal, Czech Republic, India and Brazil (OECD 2008a). Over the 2000-2006 period, ‘with the exception of 
Austria, substantial increases in R&D intensity have almost exclusively taken place in those [EU] countries with 
lower initial R&D intensities’ (Veltri et al. 2009). 
5  European  Union  Scientific  and  Technical  Research  Committee  (CREST)  is  an  advisory  committee  to  the 
European Council and the European Commission on issues relating to scientific and technical research.  
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response to bridge the gap between the private and social rate of return when the market 
fails to provide sufficient quantities of R&D, as it leaves the choice of how to conduct and 
pursue R&D programs in the hands of the private sector. This is not the only or even the 
main reason for the growing market-oriented approach of R&D policies since tax incentives 
have the potential to support R&D projects that would have been undertaken anyway. Other 
reasons are related to the fact that tax incentives are better at stimulating business R&D 
expenditures and meet political R&D goals, are easily adaptable instruments to respond to 
changes in competing tax incentives schemes, and might be the recognition that firms are 
more efficient than governments in allocating R&D resources and undertaking research. The 
latter  is,  moreover,  the  underlying  principle  of  the  system  of  Canada,  one  of  the  first 
countries to introduce R&D tax incentives in the early 1980s.
6 After all, the business sector 
already performs and finances about three quarters of all research in the OECD. 
 
This is the era of goals-based R&D policies. The focus of R&D policy has changed several 
times since the World War II for political and economic reasons (Freeman and Soete 1997); 
currently, the R&D policy of many governments is designed in accordance with the specific 
(business) R&D intensity objectives they have set to achieve. Besides the EU, many countries 
have also set R&D intensity objectives. For example, Portugal aims to increase threefold the 
business R&D intensity over the 2005-2010 period (from 0,27% to 0,8% of GDP); Canada 
aims to increase R&D intensity to the level of the top five countries in the OECD by 2010 
(Thomson 2009); China has committed to increase R&D intensity from 1.23% in 2004 to 2% 
of GDP in 2010 and to 2.5% by 2020 (OECD 2008a); Brazil aims to increase R&D intensity 
from 0,51% to 0,65% of GDP in 2010 (IEDI 2010). There is no other period in the history 
where the S&T policy of so many countries has been oriented to achieve specific (business) 
R&D intensity objectives. 
 
Governments face a fundamental dilemma: they establish business R&D intensity objectives 
and implement R&D policies for achieving those objectives, but they depend greatly on the 
R&D  system  and  particularly  on  firms  to finance  and  undertake  the  research.  Thus,  the 
problem of governments is how to design and implement the best policy mix to stimulate 
firms to invest in R&D the necessary amount to meet the set political objectives. To solve 
                                                      
6 See Klassen et al. (2004).   
  12 
this dilemma and get firms to invest more in R&D, including SMEs, the policy mix must be 
more market-oriented and leave firms the choice of how to conduct and pursue R&D, which 
is widely acknowledged as a major advantage of tax incentives. Solving the dilemma involves 
increasing the generosity of tax incentives as well as the potential for the inefficient use of 
public resources. 
 
Another  reason  in  favour  of  more  market-oriented  policies  has  to  do  with  the 
acknowledgment  that  firms  may  be  more  efficient  than  governments  in  selecting  the 
technologies and R&D projects to invest. Direct measures involve a competition for funding 
and competing R&D projects are subject to certain rules and conditions. Governments define 
which areas of research, technology fields and industrial sectors are strategically important 
to support, and select the ‘best’ R&D projects among competing ones that fit such political 
objectives or intents. This two-stage filtering process is not necessarily more successful than 
private firms in choosing the most productive way of investing in R&D
7, and governments 
incur the risk of not supporting valuable research projects or technologies. Tax incentives 
schemes do not have such kind of problem because the choice of which R&D projects to 
invest is left to the firm, and firms will choose R&D projects that best fit their needs. In 
today's fast-changing technology environment and globalised competition, firms might be 
better  positioned  to  select  the  best  R&D  projects  to  invest  and  react  more  quickly  to 
technological and market changes. 
 
Striving for mobile R&D investment and researchers 
 
Countries compete for foreign R&D investment and qualified researchers while, at the same 
time, try to offer attractive conditions to avoid the displacement of firms, R&D investment 
and qualified researchers. R&D tax incentives are policy instruments used by governments to 
achieve  national  and  international  targets,  and  to  enhance the business  environment  in 
order  to  attract  new  investment,  spurred  by  an  aggressive  competition  for  R&D-based 
investment worldwide (Warda 2006). Such ‘aggressive competition’ is the consequence of 
two main factors. On the one hand, it has to do with the worldwide concern of governments 
                                                      
7 It does not imply that Governments should not support R&D projects in technologies or sectors considered 
important by the society.  
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to  increase  R&D  expenditures  and  the  goals-based  R&D  policy  of  a  growing  number  of 
countries, which are putting great pressure on the demand side of R&D resources at an 
international level. On the other hand, the current trend in the internalisation of business 
research  where  ‘the  progressive  international  re-localisation  of  R&D  facilities  is  fast 
becoming a key element in the overall process of economic globalisation; in all ERA countries 
[…] a significant part of business R&D is performed by affiliates of foreign parent companies’ 
(Veltri et al. 2009). ‘Access to public support for R&D’ is an important factor for the firms’ 
R&D location decisions (European Commission 2008b). 
 
Tax incentives are appealing to governments because there is no other instrument in the 
government’s armoury better equipped in terms of flexibility and effectiveness to deal with 
this increasing international competition for R&D investment, and it is prescribed by the EU 
to  raise  (business)  R&D  expenditures.  A  growing  line  of  research  over  recent  years  has 
focused on the international comparison of R&D tax incentives systems, which vary greatly 
between countries, being B-index
8 the most popular indicator used to compare the relative 
generosity of tax incentives systems. This is an important source of information that helps 
governments to better design and fine-tuning R&D tax incentives to meet national R&D 
objectives and react to international competition. Table 2 illustrates the evolution of the 
Portuguese tax incentives system (SIFIDE
9) since its introduction in 1997. Its generosity has 
improved  enormously  and  currently  Portugal  offers  one  of  the  most  attractive  R&D  tax 
incentives systems in the OECD. The preface to the Decree-Law no. 197/2001 is clear about 
the motives underlying the changes to SIFIDE in 2001, that is, because ‘other countries, 
namely Spain, have changed their regimes too’, and it must remain ‘competitive with similar 
systems’. Currently, the maximum amount of combined tax credit can reach as much as 
82,5% (32,5%+50%) of a firm’s annual R&D expenditures. Besides that, firms can get direct 
subsidies for research from the Portuguese structural programme QREN 2007-2013. 
 
                                                      
8 ‘The B-index measures the minimum present value of before-tax income that a firm needs to generate in 
order to cover the cost of the intangible (e.g. R&D, patent, software, training etc.) investment and to pay the 
applicable corporate income taxes. The lower the index the greater is the incentive for a firm to invest in a 
given intangible’ (Warda 2006). 
9  SIFIDE  –  Sistema  de  Incentivos  Fiscais  em  Investigação  e  Desenvolvimento  Empresarial.  SIFIDE  has  been 
changed by the ‘RFI – Reserva Fiscal para Investimento’ (Fiscal Reservation for Investment) in 2004 and 2005, 
and reintroduced again in 2006.  
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Table 2 Characteristics and evolution of SIFIDE 
  1997  2001  2005
(a)  2009  % change 
(2009/1997) 
Level rate (volume of R&D 
expenditures of the year) 
8%  20%  20%  32,5%  406,25% 
Increment rate (on the 
increment of R&D expenditures 
over past two years average) 
30%  50%  50%  50%  166,67% 
Deduction base  Income tax payable  --- 
Carry forward (years to claim the 
tax benefit) 
3  6  6  6  200,00% 
Tax credit limits per year: 
  - volume-based tax credit  
















Source: Decrees-Law (no. 292/97, 197/2001, 40/2005), Law no. 10/2009; Carvalho (2006); author (right end 
column). Note: (a) To take effect in 2006. 
 
While some countries like the UK are using tax incentives as a central role in the policy mix 
to promote business R&D (European Commission 2008a), in other countries such as in the 
United States, the tax incentives system has been getting weaker over the years and is 
raising  concerns  about  its  attractiveness  as  a  location  for  R&D  investment,  namely  in 
comparison  with  its  neighbours  Mexico  and  Canada  (Atkinson  2007).  Although  Spain, 
Mexico, France and China had the most generous R&D tax incentives in 2008 (OECD 2008b), 
tax benefits have become moving targets as the international panorama changes rapidly 
with a growing number and variety of R&D tax incentives. Even countries that do not have 
R&D tax incentives, including Germany, Finland and Sweden, have a growing interest in its 
implementation  to  meet  certain  S&T  policy  goals  such  as  stimulating  R&D  in  SMEs  or 
fostering cooperation between public research and industry (OECD 2008b). 
 
4. Effectiveness of public support of private R&D 
 
Tax incentives vis-à-vis direct measures 
 
In  the  context  of  R&D  policy,  tax  incentives  and  direct  measures  should  be  viewed  as 
complementary tools that are suitable for different purposes (CREST 2006). The European 
Commission (2003a) incites Member States to design and implement a balanced policy mix, 
being common the coexistence of both instruments in a non-mutually exclusive way. The 
fact is the relative importance of each instrument in the policy mix has evolved in recent  
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years  and  direct  measures  are  being  increasingly  replaced  by  tax  incentives  in  many 
countries  (OECD  2008a;  Veltri  et  al.  2009).  Table  3  compares  the  advantages  and 
disadvantages of each instrument from the perspective of the public policy, having in mind 
that direct measures and tax incentives represent distinct ways of public support of private 
R&D; the former funds the execution of private research with subsidies, loans or grants, 
while  the  latter  compensates  firms  through  tax  credits  or  allowances  for  research 
undertaken. 
 
Table 3 Advantages and disadvantages of tax incentives vs. direct measures  

















- Best suited to encourage high risk projects and to 
meet specific policy goals [1,9] 
- Adequate to target R&D activities with the highest 
discrepancy between social and private returns [5] 
- Competition between firms ensures that public 
resources are directed to the best R&D projects [1] 
- Can be used to target specific technologies or scientific 
areas to overcome cyclical or sectoral slowdowns [3,5] 
- Encourage cooperation and technology transfer [3,9] 
- Better budget control [5] 
- High administrative costs [1,5] 
- Administratively not feasible to process a 
high number of applications [1]  
- Firms may not undertake R&D projects not 
approved for public funding 

















- Encourage an increase of R&D across the whole 
spectrum of firms [1] (but can be used to target 
specific groups of firms)  
- The private sector can decide what is the most 
productive way to invest [1,4,6,7] 
- Non-discriminatory nature in terms of research, 
technology fields or industrial sectors [1,2,5] 
- Less risk of governmental failure in ‘picking winners’ 
(choosing the wrong R&D projects) [4,5] 
- Encourage companies to report their profits more 
accurately [4] 
- Avoid misappropriation of funds and rent-seeking 
activities by government’s civil servants [5] 
- Avoid an up-front budget since support is by means of 
forgone tax revenues 
- Lower administrative costs of planning, allocation and 
management [1,4,5] 
- Least burdensome way of increasing business R&D [9] 
- Poor budget control [5] 
- Greater risk of dead weight loss (supporting 
projects which would have been performed 
anyway) [4] 
- Less additionality in the case of very large 
companies [4] 
- Risk of firms relabeling other activities as 
R&D [4,9] 
- Government are not more successful than 
the private sector in ‘picking winners’ [5] 
- Private firms will choose R&D projects with 
the highest private rates of return [5,7] 
- Risk that the globalisation of R&D may 
reduce local R&D spillovers to society [9,10]  
Sources: [1] CREST (2006); [2] OECD (2008a); [3] European Commission (2003a); [4] CREST (2004); [5] Van 
Pottelsberghe et al. (2003); [6] Atkinson (2007); [7] Hall and Reenen (2000); [8] Freeman and Soete (1997); [9] 
Veltri et al. (2009); [10] Griliches (1995). 
 
The efficacy of each policy instrument should be linked to the broad political objective it is 
meant to achieve. Direct measures are preferred when the rationale behind government 
support  to  R&D  is  that  the  amount  of  R&D  undertaken  in  not  optimal  from  a  societal 
perspective (Van Pottelsberghe et al. 2003). Unlike tax incentives, direct measures may also  
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be more appropriate to target specific actors or technology areas whenever there is a need 
to rectify weaknesses or build on strengths (CREST 2004). On the other hand, the appeal of 
tax  incentives  stems  from  their  non-discriminatory  nature  in  terms  of  research  and 
technology fields or industrial sectors (OECD 2008a). Fiscal incentives are increasingly used 
to encourage business research as they can support a wide population of firms, including 
SMEs, while leaving enterprises a maximum of independence (European Commission 2003a), 
and tax credit is the principal tool a government has for influencing the overall level of 
corporate R&D (Atkinson 2007).  
 
It is apparent from Table 3 that tax incentives are not a panacea for increasing business R&D 
expenditures, but the growing preference for tax incentives over direct measures can be 
explained at three different levels. At a political level, tax incentives are less restrictive, less 
selective  and  leave  firms  the decision  of  what R&D  projects  to  undertake,  three  critical 
conditions  to  increase  business  R&D  expenditures,  appeal  to  a  larger  number  of  firms 
(including SMEs) to perform R&D and reach R&D political goals, provided there will be some 
degree of overlooking of the negative aspects of tax incentives systems. At an economic 
level,  it  is  widely  recognised  that  tax  incentives  involve  smaller  administrative  costs  to 
implement  (Van  Pottelsberghe  et  al.  2003),  are  less  suitable  ‘to  reward  lobbyists  and 
bureaucrats’ (Hall and Reenen 2000), and, most important, do not require budget funding as 
public support is in the form of forgone tax revenues. Besides that, direct measures are not 
efficient  to  process  a  high  number  of  applications  (CREST  2006)  and,  thus,  are  not 
appropriate  to  encourage  a  larger  number  of  firms,  including  SMEs,  to  increase  R&D 
expenditures, which is implicit in a goals-based R&D policy. At a strategic level, tax incentives 
are better suited to respond to the growing competition for international R&D investment. 
 
Effectiveness of tax incentives 
 
The  wide  interest  for  R&D  tax  incentives  should  be  indicative  of  its  effectiveness  but, 
‘notwithstanding the world-wide enthusiasm for R&D tax incentives, the empirical evidence 
of their effectiveness is mixed’ (Thomson 2009). Assessing the effectiveness of tax incentives 
policies is not an easy task but it is critical to understand and justify the public support of 
business R&D. The Expert Group on Fiscal Measures for Research found out that there is a  
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severe lack of thorough evaluations and thus of reliable information on effectiveness and 
efficiency  of  tax  incentives  in  the  EU  countries  (CREST  2004,  2006).  Ultimately,  ‘the 
effectiveness of fiscal incentives to R&D depends very much on the design of tax measures 
relative to policy objectives’ (OECD 2002). 
 
How can the effectiveness of tax incentives policies be measured? There are two approaches 
according to Hall and Van Reenen (2000):  i) by asking if ‘the level of the good supplied after 
the implementation of the policy is such that the social return is equal to the social cost’, 
which ‘would involve comparing the marginal return to industrial R&D dollars at the societal 
level to the opportunity cost of using the extra tax dollars in another way’; ii) by comparing 
‘the amount of incremental industrial R&D to the loss in tax revenue’, which has been the 
preferred approach. According to the latter, if the ratio of the amount of R&D induced by 
the tax credit to the tax revenue that is lost due to the presence of the incentive ‘is greater 
than one, the tax credit is a more cost-effective way to achieve the given level of R&D 
subsidy; if it is less than one, it would be cheaper to simply fund the R&D directly’ (Hall and 
van Reenen 2000). Other approaches are also important, although not much explored yet. 
The effectiveness of tax incentives might be measured in the context of the police mix and 
the relative importance of each policy instrument (Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe 2003); in 
light  of  the  impact  that  the  internalisation  of  R&D  has  on  its  relative  efficiency  (OECD 




A major line of research attempted to know the extent to which can tax policies leverage 
business R&D by measuring the amount of additional business R&D per unit of forgone 
public revenue, and using as indicator the price-elasticity of R&D. In the Van Pottelsberghe 
et al.’s (2003) overview of studies on the effectiveness of fiscal R&D incentives, the R&D 
price-elasticity  results  ranged  from  -0,04  to  -2,7,  with  an  average  value  for  the  price-
elasticity  around  -0,81,  meaning  that  for  each  Euro  of  tax  incentives  business  R&D 
                                                      
10 Thomson (2009) analysed 25 OECD countries between 1980 and 2005 and found no evidence to support the 
hypothesis that tax incentives are effective in either inducing MNEs affiliates to undertake additional R&D or to 
encourage additional international R&D contracts.  
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expenditures  increased  by  a  magnitude  of  about  0,81  Euro  on  average.
11  ‘A  tax  price 
elasticity of around unity is still a good ballpark figure, although there is a good deal of 
variation around’ (Hall and Van Heenen 2000). 
 
Despite the mixed results and the insufficiency of research, there is nevertheless a wide 
conviction that tax policies can indeed induce firms to increase R&D expenditures (Falk 2006; 
Atkinson 2007; Becker and Pain 2008; OECD 2008a). ‘There is substantial evidence’ of that 
relationship (Hall and Van Heenen 2000) and ‘most studies also find that social returns to 
such R&D far outweigh private returns’ (OECD 2002).  Furthermore, the few evaluations 
carried out show a positive but moderate level of additionality, but a substantial amount of 
potential  R&D  spillovers  which  strengthen  the  positive  impact  of  tax  credit  (European 
Commission 2003b). Atkinson (2007) is assertive when stating that ‘the credit is an effective 
tool and that at minimum it produces at least one dollar of research for every tax dollar 
forgone.’ Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) conclude that the effectiveness of R&D tax 
policies increases when the government funding of business R&D decreases.  
 
These  claims  sustain  the  idea  that  tax  incentives  are  efficient  as  long  as  ‘for  each  €  of 
forgone tax income, at least one € of additional business R&D expenditure is undertaken’ 
(Van Pottelsberghe et al. 2003) and are very much in favour of R&D tax policies. This is good 
news  for  governments,  but  these  claims  do  not  take  properly  into  account  neither  the 
shortage  of  prior  studies  on  the  effectiveness  of  R&D  tax  incentives,  nor  the  potential 
negative  aspects  of  R&D  tax  incentives  referred  to  elsewhere  and  the  fact  that  the 
globalisation of R&D might reduce the positive R&D spillovers to society if such spillovers are 
obtained elsewhere (Griliches 1995; Veltri et al. 2009). 
 
5. Conclusion and policy implications 
 
Innovation  and  R&D,  namely  business  R&D,  are  two  fundamental,  interrelated  support 
pillars of a knowledge-based economy and governments worldwide are concerned about 
how to better stimulate both. This paper focuses on R&D tax incentives and attempts to 
                                                      
11 For an overview of studies into the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives see, for example, Hall and Van 
Reenen (2000), Van Pottelsberghe et al (2003), European Commission (2003b), and Atkinson (2007).  
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explain the rationale behind the recent trends of tax incentives policies to promote business 
R&D, which show a growing number of countries implementing tax incentives policies, a 
steady substitution of direct funding for tax incentives, and the increasing generosity of most 
tax incentives systems worldwide to increase the level of attractiveness of countries. This is a 
complex issue that is best understood if three levels of analysis are considered in explaining 
the phenomenon, namely the recent changes in the economic rationale of public support of 
private  R&D,  changes  in  the  political  and  strategic  intent  of  R&D  policies,  and  the 
effectiveness of public support of private R&D. All of this should be understood in the new 
international context of growing competition for international R&D investment and qualified 
researchers. 
 
Market failure is no longer the sole economic rationale for the public support of private 
R&D, if it ever was. Two other factors are important: innovation and economic growth, and 
the  competition  for  R&D  investment  and  qualified  researchers.  The  former  can  be 
empirically observed in the EU R&D policy at least from the 1990s as the understanding 
about the R&D function within the firm and the systemic implications of R&D across the 
economy became clearer, but the latter is new and is largely the result of the political efforts 
of many countries to increase business R&D expenditures over this decade. Market failure, 
pre-competitive R&D and similar expressions are rapidly becoming unused or meaningless 
words  in  R&D  policy  while  the  amount  of  R&D  expenditures,  business  R&D  goals  and 
competition  for  R&D  investment  and  skilled  researchers  are  increasingly  relevant  in  the 
political agendas. Today, the question is less about whether governments should stimulate 
business R&D (in industries showing market failures or not), but more about the best police 
mix to increase business R&D intensity and cope with the growing international competition 
for R&D. It should also be about the limits of generosity of public policies and the dividing 
line between public stimulation and public substitution of business R&D.  
 
The Lisbon Agenda and the Action Plan to reach the Barcelona objective are two political 
facts with major implications for the growing interest of governments for tax incentives 
within and outside the EU. It has put great pressure on the demand side of R&D investment 
and researchers, and stirred up worldwide competition for international R&D investment. 
This is the goals-based R&D policy era. There is no other time in the history where the S&T  
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policy of so many countries is designed to reach specific, often ambitious, (business) R&D 
objectives. Such objectives can only be achieved with more market-oriented policies, greater 
incentives  and  larger  participation  of  firms,  including  SMEs,  greater  control  over  the 
allocation of R&D resources by the private sector, and greater risk of using inefficiently the 
public resources. Tax incentives are probably the best instrument that governments have at 
hand capable of rapidly increasing R&D expenditures and meet political objectives, even if at 
a cost of some inefficiency, which is flexible enough to respond to the growing international 
competition for R&D investment.  
 
The wide interest for R&D tax incentives should be indicative of its effectiveness but the 
empirical evidence is mixed. Tax incentives have advantages over direct measures if the 
objective of R&D policy is to involve a larger number of firms in R&D activities, increase the 
amount of business R&D expenditures, avoid the rewarding of ‘lobbyists and bureaucrats’ 
and respond to international competition for R&D. Besides the insufficiency of research, 
especially in the EU countries, there is a certain consensus that, in general, for each € of 
forgone tax income at least one € of additional business R&D expenditure is undertaken, 
which is the landmark for the effectiveness of tax incentives policies. This is a poor measure 
of efficiency because it does not take properly into account neither the shortage of prior 
studies on the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives, nor the potential negative aspects of R&D 
tax incentives (less efficiency in the use of public resources) and the fact that, due to the 
globalisation of R&D, most of the R&D spillovers might not be obtained in the country that 
supports the research, which is more likely to happen in small open economies (Griliches 
1995).  The  effectiveness  of  R&D  tax  incentives  should  also be  assessed  according  to  its 
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